Source : M. Broszat & H. Krausnick , Anatomy of the SS State (London, 1965), pp.143-173.
The division of responsibility between the SS and the Political Police was laid down in the so-called functional decree issued by the Reichs-fuehrer-SS on 1 July 1937. The text of this decree has so far not been found; something of its content can be gathered from a memorandum by Schellenberg (written in typical SS official German) dated 24 February 1939:
'Moreover it seems that the reason for non-appointment of a common head in Gestapo and SD Abschnitte is that the so-called "functional order" of 1 July 1937 did not bring about a combination of the two in so far as their operations were concerned. The functional order did not itself lay down the necessary interlocking organisation between the various functional cogs in the machine (information service-executive evaluation); instead it laid down spheres of responsibility showing what functions were to be allotted to this or that branch without laying down a clear dividing line between information service and executive and without giving priority to one or the other.'
According to the functional decree the SD had to hand over to the Gestapo its individual personal files, but this was done only very slowly; it is quite possible that right up to the outbreak of war individual cases were still being dealt with by the SD. The final division of responsibility between the Gestapo and the SD seems, in fact, to have been laid down only in the 4 August 1941 decree concerning enemy intelligence; this introduced into every local Gestapo office [Stapo-Stelle] a so-called intelligence adviser who kept a card index of police informers and supervised their co-operation with the various experts.
In 1938, during the arguments, which led to the formation of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt [Reich Central Security Office] in the autumn of 1939, consideration was given to disbanding the SD or turning it into a State authority. The principal reason for its continued existence and its maintenance as a Nazi Party organisation and the sole Party information service, was probably that this was the only method by which Himmler could be sure of retaining his monopoly within the Nationalist Socialist Movement. If he had disbanded or officialised the SD, some Party authority might have set up an intelligence service to report on the Movement.
The racial policy field provides a parallel here. In spring 1942 an office for racial questions was set up within the headquarters of the Nazi Party; it was headed by Himmler but specifically not in his capacity as Reichskommissar fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums [Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germanism] but as Party representative for racial questions. He was empowered to issue executive instructions only in agreement with the Head of the Party Chancellery, the Reich Party Treasurer and Chief Party Organiser. By this device Himmler achieved two objects; in the first place he eliminated any possibility of some authority not under his control being set up to deal with racial policy within the Nazi Party; secondly he satisfied the Party's claim to have a voice in racial political questions.
The SD intelligence monopoly within the National Socialist Movement was based on the following instruction issued by the Fuehrer's Deputy on 9 June 1934:
'1 The preliminaries for the transfer to the Sicherheitsdienst RFSS of the internal intelligence organisation of the Aussenpolitisches Amt (of the Nazi Party) having been completed, the transfer will now take place forthwith.
2 In so far as this has not already been done, executive instructions for the transfer will be agreed between the Chief of the Sicher-heitsamt RFSS and the Head of the Aussenpolitische Nach-richtendienst [Foreign Political Intelligence Service].
3 The Chief of the Sicherieitsamt RFSS will report completion of the transfer to me through the Reichsfuehrer-SS by 15 July 1934.
4 Once the transfer has taken place, apart from the Sicher-heitsdienst RFSS, there will be no Party intelligence or counter-espionage service, not even in the form of an internal intelligence organisation for foreign policy purposes.
5 Payment by Gauleiter to any form of intelligence office will cease from 1 July 1934. A contribution for the work of the SD will be made to the central office, special instructions being issued by the Party Treasurer.
6 The Sicherheitsamt RFSS will make available to Gauleiter special information reports giving such results of their activities as may be of importance. Gauleiter will be personally responsible to me for preservation of the secrecy of these reports.
The information sheet 'IFO' will cease. The Chief of the Sicherheitsamt will instruct the heads of SD Oberabschnitte through the usual channels to keep Gauleiter informed as necessary of matters of importance to them.
At the next Gauleiter meeting I propose to give the Reichs-fuehrer-SS an opportunity to inform the Gauleiter of the work of the SD and conduct them round SS headquarters.'
Foreign Policy Office.
On 14 December 1938 this monopoly was confirmed by a further instruction issued by the Fuehrer's Deputy; the initial paragraphs read as follows:
'By virtue of my instruction of 9 June 1934 the Sicherheitsdienst RFSS is established as the sole political information and counterespionage service of the NSDAP, its organisations and affiliated formations.
The SD-RFSS is a Party institution. The SS, as a branch of the Party, is responsible for organisation and manning of this institution.'
The price which the SD had to pay for this monopoly was a ban on any activity connected with internal Party affairs; any complaints concerning the Party which might reach it were to be forwarded to the Fuehrer's Deputy or later to the Head of the PartyChancellery. There were, however, frequent infringements of this regulation, probably with Himmler's or Heydrich's secret connivance. It was notorious that in a whole series of cases the SD was concerning itself with Party matters, and complaints were accordingly made to Himmler. Correspondence with Gauleiters Florian and Weinrich of 1942/3 has been found in which both complained about the SD. Florian referred to a questionnaire issued to SD agents in the Duesseldorf Leitabschnitt [Region] asking for a detailed report on Nazi Party festivities. He added: 'My suspicion, hitherto unfortunately impossible to prove, that the SD is meddling in Party matters, is unequivocally confirmed by this questionnaire.' Weinrich wrote to the Party Chancellery that he had been watching the activity of the Gestapo and SD with astonishment for years, the SD being worse than the Gestapo. Many of the SD agents, he said, were "odd fish" and only junior Party members (1940 vintage); if these people continued to report on internal Party matters he would accuse them of anti-Party activity.
In the autumn of 1933 the activity of the SD received facial sanction by Ministry of the Interior decree dated 11 November.
'As an intelligence organisation for Party and State - in particular in support of the security police - the Sicherheitsdienst RFS S (SD) has important tasks to fulfil. In fulfilling them, the SD is acting in an official capacity. This necessitates close and sympathetic co-operation between the SD and the general and civil administration authorities.'
Although the available sources tell us no more of the details, it is reasonable to suppose that there was some connection between this grant of official status and confirmation of the SD monopoly, that this marked the end of the SD crisis and was the start of those further developments which led to the formation of the Reichssicherheits-hauptamt (RSHA) in the autumn of 1939.
Although in the early years of the Third Reich the SD had no true sphere of responsibility, it was nevertheless not without considerable political influence. Surrounded by the SS aura, it not only functioned as an auxiliary police force but busied itself in matters of political importance over the most varied fields. The real significance of the SD, however, lay in the fact that it produced a whole series of people who, as the years went by, came to occupy positions of political importance within the Security Police. Later, during the war, they are to be found as leaders of Einsatzkommandos [action commandos] or as Befehlshaber [Security Police Commanders] and Kommandanten [local commanders] and in influential positions within the RSHA.
Finally, as an independent formation within the Gesamt-SS, the SD had a definite organisational function; during Himmler's fusion of the SS and police, members of the police were brought under more or less severe pressure to join the SS. Members of the Sicherheitspolizei were drafted into the SD and wore SS uniform with the so-called SD diamond on the left sleeve, Since, when working in the occupied territories, the Sicherheitspolizei normally wore SS uniform, they were considered by the outside foreign observer to be the SD, just as in Germany proper they were identified with the Gestapo.
The 'Reichssicherheitshauptamt': Further Development of the Regional
and Local Organisation of the 'Sicherheitspolizei' and the SD
On 27 September 1939 the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst RFSS (SD) were amalgamated to form the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA).
(Reich Security Department - abbreviated RSHA. This abbreviation will be used throughout.) Compared to the fundamental changes of 1936, however, this did not in fact produce anything very new. Of course once again a governmental office, Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, and a Nazi Party office, Chief of the SD, were merged into a single post "Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und dew SD" [Chief of the Security Police and SD]; In this case, however, it represented the culmination rather than initiation of a phase of development. In the first place th e Sicherheits-polizei had in practice already been divorced from the State and turned into an instrument of the Fuehrer's authority; secondly the SD was, and continued to be, only an auxiliary. In this case, therefore, the SD did not swallow up the Sicherheitspolizei but vice versa.
The "amalgamation of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD Z entrale Aemter" [central offices] into the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) was decreed by Himmler on 27 September 1939, to take effect on 1 October 1939. The RSHA was organised as follows:
RSHA Amt 2 I was formed from:
Amt 'administration and legal' of Hauptamt Sipo
Amt I of the SD Hauptamt (less 1/3)
Abteilung 3 I of the Gestapa
Abteilung IV of the Gestapa
In charge: Dr Best. Best's presence accounted for the inclusion of Abteilung IV from the Gestapo in Amt I ; in addition to his general and organisation duties, he was responsible for the build up of the Abwehrpolizei [counter-espionage police].
RSHA Amt II was formed from:
Abteilung II/1 (investigation of opposition) from the SD Hauptamt
Abteilung 1/3 of the SD Hauptamt
In charge: Professor Six.
RSHA Amt III was formed from:
Abteilung II/2 (Spheres of German Life) 4 from the SD Hauptamt In charge : Ohlendorf.
RSHA Amt IV was formed from:
Political police department of Hauptamt Sipo.
Abteilung II of the Gestapa
Abteilung III of the Gestapa.
In charge : Heinrich Mueller.
References:
1. Abbreviated CSSD. This abbreviation will be used throughout.
